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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this policy report is to elucidate the current Arctic strategies and
capabilities of the major Arctic nations – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the
United States – with the aim of identifying American shortcomings in the region and
potential policy suggestions to correct these failings. The report first illuminates the
potential for resource gain in the Arctic, specifically with respect to oil and natural gas
and the potential for commercial growth represented by new Arctic shipping routes. The
report also discusses the difficulties associated with reaping the rewards of the Arctic,
specifically the lack of maritime infrastructure, the additional costs and risks associated
with operating in the Arctic, and the speed with which the Arctic is melting.
In general, the report finds that Arctic nations other than the United States are
moving aggressively to protect their current and future commercial gains in the Arctic
operating space. All countries are doing so by adhering to international legal standards
such as the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas and creating Arctic-specific domestic
policies. The much vaunted military expansion in the Arctic is nothing more than
countries attempting to protect and police their economic gains in the region. The United
States has fallen far behind in all of these regards, and stands to lose out in the Arctic if it
does not correct this situation immediately.
The report presents the following suggestions for the United States:
1. Create an “American Arctic Policy” document at the Executive level
2. Accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
3. Approve or facilitate funding for a new heavy icebreaker, while solving the question
of the Polar Sea
4. Adjudicate an appropriate compromise on the Beaufort Wedge dispute with Canada
5. Improve bilateral capabilities and create agreements with Russia in the Bering Strait
and Canada in the Beaufort Sea
6. Strengthen international Arctic cooperation through strong Arctic Council leadership
3

CHAPTER ONE: WHAT LIES BENEATH…

Introduction
On July 8, 1879, the USS Jeannette departed from San Francisco in a bid to make
the United States the first nation to reach the North Pole. After successfully transiting the
Bering Strait and claiming three newly discovered islands for the United States in the
Chukchi Sea, the Jeannette became trapped in ice. Despite the fact that it was June, the
Arctic ice was thick enough for the entirety of the ship’s crew to disembark, unload their
cargo, supplies, and even scientific equipment, and begin trekking across the frozen
Arctic “Ocean”, eventually reaching mainland Russia a few months later.
The entire tale of the Jeannette is remarkable – from its crew’s months-long
march across the frozen Arctic to the number of new land features it discovered in an area
previously marked as an empty space on maps. However, most extraordinary about the
voyage of the Jeanette is the fact that the same solid ice across which the Jeannette’s
crew trekked is now part of a major Arctic shipping route that is most decidedly not
walkable.
The majority of the Arctic is facing a similar transition, from a previously frozen
wasteland to an open ocean with massive potential for shipping and resource extraction
beneath the surface. As this occurs, different Arctic nations are taking different paths at
different speeds to unlock the potential of a newly liquid Arctic, pursuing military,
economic, and diplomatic methods to secure their Arctic gains. As the melting of the
Arctic continues, Arctic nations will continue to fight to ensure that they reap the returns
of an ice-free Arctic.
4

Total Ice Cover
Increase resource extraction and Arctic shipping is made possible by the decrease
in the extent of the Arctic ice. Since 1979, the Arctic ice extent 1 has receded by 13.3%
per decade, with the ten lowest ice extents on record occurring in the past ten years. 2
Notably, however, Arctic ice cover is not a singular and constant landmass. Though there
is a constant ice pack at the geographic North Pole, regions at lower latitudes are less
predictable. Ice cover in these regions is more dependent on the Earth’s seasons, with
open water and thinner ice emerging in the spring and summer months. Recently,
however, the Arctic melt has increased, with record low levels of Arctic ice in the spring
and summer.
The opening of the Arctic ice is not uniform in the Arctic Circle. The Northwest
Passage, as mentioned above, for instance, is opening much more slowly than the Bering
Strait, with the latter expecting 450 vessel transits in 2020, as opposed to 200 through the
NWP. Similarly, while the Arctic ice is indeed disappearing, it is doing so over an
extended time frame. Scientists have not yet reached a consensus on when the Arctic ice
will disappear – though most agree that the Arctic will begin experiencing summers free
of ice by 2040. 3 As a whole, the Arctic will likely be free of ice entirely by the end of the
21st century. 4

1

Arctic ice extent is the measurement of the entirety of the Arctic ice mass, including any empty spaces
within it.
2
"2014 Melt Season in Review." Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis. National Snow and Ice Data Center, 07
Oct. 2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2014.
3
Holland, Marika M., Cecilia M. Bitz, and Bruno Tremblay. "Future Abrupt Reductions in the Summer
Arctic Sea Ice." Geophysical Research Letters 33.23 (2006). Web.
4
Boé, Julien, Alex Hall, and Xin Qu. "September Sea-ice Cover in the Arctic Ocean Projected to Vanish by
2100." Nature Geoscience 2.5 (2009): 341-43. Web.
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Natural Resources
The Arctic contains vast amounts of potential oil and gas resources.
Approximately 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s
undiscovered natural gas lie beneath the Arctic surface. 5 For Arctic nations, these
reserves present a huge strategic opportunity. Arctic nations that already have massive oil
and gas sectors, such as Russia, Norway, and Canada, have the opportunity to expand
their supplies of oil and gas for domestic consumption or foreign export. For the United
States and Denmark, there is an opportunity to reduce dependence on foreign oil and
bolster domestic resource production.
However, Arctic offshore drilling is far more technically challenging than drilling
in the rest of the world’s oceans. Arctic drilling rigs must contend with adverse weather
conditions, freezing temperatures, and shifting and unpredictable pack ice that increase
costs and make production more difficult. Government permits do not allow oil
companies to drill in ice, meaning that all drilling must be conducted in open water areas
with floating iceberg. As a result, companies have had to develop either ice-resistant
drilling rigs that can withstand the impact of an iceberg, or drilling rigs that can float and
move away from the well to avoid an impact. 6 There have already been a number of
incidents in Arctic drilling caused by unfamiliarity with the operating environment. In
2012, Shell Oil’s Arctic drilling rig Kulluk broke apart from its towing unit, grounding
itself in the Gulf of Alaska after the crew of the towing unwittingly used equipment
5

United States of America. United States Geological Survey. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal
Assessment Team. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the
Arctic Circle. 2008. Print.
6
Pickard, Ann. "Arctic: Questions Answered." Interview. Shell Sustainability Report 2014 2014: 32-33.
Print.
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unsuitable for the Arctic operating environment. More famously, the Exxon Valdez ran
aground in the Prince William Sound in 1989, spilling hundreds of thousands of barrels
of oil and causing an ecological disaster and marine habitat collapse, illustrating the
increased dangers of Arctic oil spills.
Further, in many nations, Arctic offshore drilling is limited to a select few
companies that must go through a rigorous application process and follow strict safety
regulations in order to drill in the Arctic. On an environmental level, an oil spill in the
Arctic comes with additional burdens and challenges. The same adverse weather
conditions that make drilling in the Arctic difficult make response and cleanup of an oil
spill incredibly problematic, potentially even impossible. A more obvious concern comes
from an oil spill akin to the Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010. If a spill were to occur
underwater, oil would accumulate under the Arctic ice, again making cleanup close to
impossible. On a brighter note, the potential catastrophe of an Arctic oil spill has led to an
international agreement. In 2013, members of the Arctic Council signed The Agreement
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, which
delineates specific responsibilities amongst the different Arctic nations in the event of an
oil spill. 7
The regulations and hazards involved with Arctic drilling makes it a difficult
enterprise. While many energy interests have spent time exploring, drilling, and
attempting to pursue production in the Arctic, they have demurred recently due to a high
cost of production and lower oil prices. After the 2014 fall in the price of oil, a majority

7

"Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic". May 15,
2013. Kiruna, Sweden.
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of Arctic energy interests, ranging from Chevron and Shell in the Canadian Arctic to
Norwegian company Statoil, have ceased Arctic operations until oil prices rebound.8
Russia’s Prirazlomnoye oil field, for instance, is unprofitable with oil at $60 per barrel,
and would only be profitable with oil prices at or above $100 per barrel. 9
Regardless of the regulations and investment involved with Arctic drilling, energy
interests and Arctic nations continue to authorize drilling permits and seek new Arctic
offshore oil reserves, especially as present reserves diminish. Drilling in Alaska’s North
Slope, for instance, used to account for one-fifth of US oil production, though that
amount has fallen by two-thirds since peaking in 1988 due to declining reserves. 10 Given
that companies such as Shell already have invested up to $4 billion in Arctic
infrastructure that would be expensive or logistically difficult to move elsewhere, these
energy interests are seeking to tap new Arctic oil reserves in search of new profits. 11 For
sovereign nations, Arctic drilling holds vast economic promise. In the United States, for
instance, 50% of Alaskan jobs, and 98% of the Alaskan economy is dependent on the
aforementioned North Slope. 12 As such, the United States has a massive interest in
shifting the bulk of current Alaskan oil production to Arctic offshore reserves.

8

Schultz, Colin. "Oil Companies Are Pausing Plans to Drill the Arctic." Smithsonian.com. The
Smithsonian Institution, 19 Dec. 2014. Web.
9
Petterson, Trude. "Ecologists: Prirazlomnaya Unprofitability Approaches $600 Million." Barents
Observer. Norwegian Barents Secretariat, 25 Mar. 2015. Web.
10
Schmidt, Charles W. "Offshore Exploration in the Arctic: Can Shell’s Oil-Spill Response Plans Keep
Up?" Environmental Health Perspectives 120.5 (2012): 194-99. Web.
11
"Resources: Hidden Treasure." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper Limited, 16 June 2012. Web.
12
Ebinger, Charles, John P. Banks, and Alisa Schackmann. Offshore Oil and Gas Governance in the Arctic.
The Energy Security Initiative. The Brookings Institution, Mar. 2014. Web.
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Arctic Shipping
Arctic shipping takes place primarily along the northern borders of Russia and
Canada. These routes are referred to as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest
Passage (NWP) respectively. A third route, known as the Arctic Bridge Route (ABR),
stretches from the Hudson Bay in Canada to the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. The
fourth route, the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) crosses the Arctic more centrally, passing
through the North Pole. Shipping along these routes is extremely limited, and is likely to
continue to be so for the near future. Within the four potential Arctic sea routes, for
instance, only the Bering Strait, which serves as the gateway to both the Northwest
Passage and the Northern Sea Route, was navigable for a large portion of the year in
2012, with the Transpolar and Northwest Passage blocked by large amounts of pack and
shoulder ice year-round. 13 In general, the first three are only passable by commercial
vessels on occasion, while the Transpolar Route is only navigable by heavy icebreakers. 14
Presently, shipping along these four routes is incredibly difficult. The Arctic
operating environment is extremely harsh, even ice-strengthened ships – those that can
navigate mild sea ice – are vulnerable to the Arctic operating environment, as was proven
by the sinking of the MS Explorer in 2007. One third of all Arctic-shipping casualties
were caused by equipment damage, a much higher average than elsewhere in the world. 15
Indeed, the little shipping that does occur on these routes presently is either so rare that it

13

United States. Department of the Navy. Navy Task Force Climate Change. U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap
2014-2030. Print. (11)
14
McGwin, Kevin. "Shipping." The Arctic Journal. Mediehuset Sermitsiaq A.G., 16 Sept. 2014. Web.
15
Dobie, Greg, ed. Safety and Shipping Review 2014. Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE, Mar. 2014.
Web.
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is newsworthy, or requires heavy assistance from icebreakers. 16 At present shipping and
maritime insurance companies are quite bearish on the prospect of Arctic shipping as a
viable possibility in the near future. 17 While many expeditions do receive one-off
insurance policies, companies have yet to begin offering dedicated coverage for Arctic
shipping.
The future of Arctic shipping is much harder to predict. Though global warming
and other climate factors are indeed increasing the rate at which Arctic ice is melting,
change may not come quickly. A study conducted by the U.S. Committee on the Marine
Transportation System concluded that ship transits through the American Arctic would
only increase by 2-8% by 2025, including an increase in traffic from ships diverting from
traditional sea routes. 18 The study can be extrapolated to project a similarly minimal
increase for the rest of the Arctic’s shipping routes, especially considering that the
American Arctic is largely comprised of the Arctic’s lower latitudes. These studies,
however, are largely based on current estimates of ship-going capabilities. Currently,
few, if any, major cargo and shipping vessels have ice-breaking capabilities. Given that
container ships can save as much as 40% of their travel time by using Arctic shipping
routes rather than the Panama or Suez canals, shipping companies are likely to continue
to consider potential cost savings derived from building an Arctic-capable vessel. 19

16

ibid
Arctic Shipping: Navigating the Risks and Opportunities. Marsh Risk Management Research, Aug. 2014.
Web.
18
United States of America. United States Department of Transportation. Committee on the Marine
Transportation System. A 10-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region. Print. (36)
19
"Shipping." The Arctic Journal.
17
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Of course, the inaccessibility of the Arctic is mitigated by the existence of
icebreakers. Container ships and cargo vessels can transit the Arctic if escorted by a
medium or heavy icebreaker. Currently, Russia dominates this capability, operating the
vast majority of the world’s icebreakers through its state-owned company Atomflot. 20 By
contrast, the United States owns only four icebreakers, one of which is laid up and
another of which is dedicated to Antarctic research. 21 Increased icebreaking capabilities
do not seem to be a priority for the United States. The National Strategy for the Arctic
makes scant mention of America’s current ice-breaking capabilities, and there are
currently no plans to build any additional ice-breaking vessels.
Infrastructural Considerations
The Arctic also continues to be a “last frontier” regarding maritime infrastructure.
Much of the Arctic, especially regions that were mainly covered in ice until recently,
remains completely unmapped and uncharted. To combat this, the International
Hydrographic Organization (IHO) – the intergovernmental association responsible for
charting the world’s navigable waters – established the Arctic Regional Hydrographic
Commission (ARHC) in 2010 to improve Arctic bathymetry. Their work focuses on
charting the Arctic region surrounding Canada, Greenland, Norway, and the United
States, which has approximately 5 million square kilometers of unassessed hydrography –
a region roughly half the size of Canada. 22 Notably, less than 1% of navigationally

20

Brigham, Lawson W., and Ben Ellis. "Arctic Marine Infrastructure." Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
2009 Report. Akureyri, Iceland: Arctic Council, PAME, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment,
2009. Print.
21
ibid
22
Hains, Denis. "Status of Arctic Hydrography and Nautical Charting." Proc. of PAME II-2014, Canada,
Whitehorse Yukon Territory. Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission, 16 Sept. 2014. Web.
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significant waters have been mapped with modern technology in the American Arctic. 23
For some parts of the Alaskan coast, the most recent bathymetry comes from Captain
James Cook’s 1778 mapping expedition. 24
However, the AHRC’s scope of work does not include Russian Arctic territory.
The Russian Federal State Unitary Hydrographic Enterprise (SHD) has been conducting
surveys since 1933 and consequently has detailed underwater topography for 90% of its
coastal navigation routes, including most of the Northern Sea Route. Though some charts
are outdated, given the decades that have passed since the initial survey, SHD has also
converted the majority of its navigation charts to digital formats usable on Electronic
Navigational Charts. 25. In this sense, Russia is well ahead of American Arctic
capabilities.
Despite Russia’s success at mapping much of its Arctic sphere of influence, it and
the rest of the world are limited by technological considerations within the Arctic.
Maritime communications generally rely on geostationary satellites that orbit above the
Equator, facilitating communications from most vessels at sea. However, the spherical
shape of the Earth prevents these satellites from reaching the area surrounding the North
and South Poles. Theoretically, satellite range should extend until 81.3° N, though
empirically, satellite communications have had difficulties starting at the 70th parallel. 26

23

United States. Government Accountability Office. Maritime Infrastructure, Key Issues Related to
Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the next Decade: Report to Congressional Requesters. 2014.
Print.
24
Brown, April. "Unmapped Routes May Pose Dangers for Shipping Boom in Arctic Waters." Newshour.
PBS, 17 Sept. 2013. Web. 29 Oct. 2014.
25
Brigham, Lawson W., and Ben Ellis. "Arctic Marine Infrastructure."
26
Kvamstad-Lervold, Beate. "What Is the Problem with Communication in the Arctic?" Norwegian Marine
Technology Research Institute. SINTEF. Web. 29 Oct. 2014.
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At present, the only commercial maritime communications system that can
operate in the Arctic is the Iridium OpenPort satellite constellation, marketed primarily at
non-governmental and scientific research consumers, though it also has been awarded
multi-million dollar contracts to handle aspects of US military communications. 27 While
the Iridium system can facilitate the Ship Safety and Alerting System mandated by the
IMO, it has a very low rate of data transfer, and frequently goes offline. Additionally, the
system is not robust enough to handle sustained, commercial transfer of ice charts and
satellite imagery to vessels operating in the Arctic. 28 By 2016, Iridium hopes to offer the
Iridium Next system, which would offer much higher data transfer speeds that would be
able to support increased Arctic operations. 29 American tactical and strategic
communications are provided by Northrop Grumman’s “Enhanced Polar System”, which
allows military units above 65 degrees north to communicate with more southern
Combatant Commander Command and Control centers. 30

27

Iridium Communications Incorporated. Iridium Awarded Contract From Defense Information Systems
Agency Worth Up to $47 Million. 31 Oct. 2012. Web.
28
Brigham, Lawson W., and Ben Ellis. "Arctic Marine Infrastructure."
29
Bowes, Michael D. "Impact of Climate Change on Naval Operations in the Arctic." Center for Naval
Analyses, Apr. 2009. Web.
30
United States of America. United States Air Force. Los Angeles Air Force Base. Enhanced Polar System.
2014. Print.
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CHAPTER TWO: FOREIGN INFLUENCES

The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
delineates international maritime boundaries. Though the United Nations has no
regulatory or operational ability to enforce the treaty itself, it is functionally international
law. Waters within a country’s shoreline – lakes, rivers, and other bodies of water
completely surrounded by the country – are considered “internal waters” and completely
under the jurisdiction of the nation. Any coastal state has complete jurisdiction over
“territorial waters”, those that up to 12 nautical miles from its ocean shore, though vessels
have the right of innocent passage 31 through these waters. Coastal nations may suspend
the right of innocent passage through their waters for purposes of national security,
except in strategic straits. In these straits, all vessels have the right to transit passage,
wherein their continuous transit through a particular strait is necessary for naval
operations.
Coastal states also have rights to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends
200 nautical miles from its shoreline and provides rights to all natural resources
contained therein. Resource rights additionally extend along a country’s continental
shelf 32 until 350 nautical miles from the shoreline. However, for countries to receive
these continental shelf rights, they must submit a claim to the UN Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) within 10 years of ratifying UNCLOS. While the
31

Innocent passage is granted to vessels transiting territorial waters in a non-commercial and non-military
manner.
32
A continental shelf is the “natural prolongation”, or extension of a country’s land into the sea
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Commission has adjudicated some claims that have been submitted – Russia’s claim to a
large area in the Sea of Okhotsk, for instance, was settled in its favor – it has not yet ruled
in favor or against any the five current Arctic submissions. The complex nature of the
claims – any one could have implications for others – means that the Commission could
take decades to decide the status of the Arctic. 33 At present, the only Arctic nations that
have submitted claims are Russia, Norway, Canada, and Denmark. Russia’s claim, which
was filed in 2001, was neither accepted nor rejected by the Commission, which requested
further data and evidence before adjudicating the claim. Russia intends to submit this
evidence in late 2015. 34 Though Canada has yet to formally submit its claim in the
Arctic, it eventually will claim parts of the Arctic also claimed by Russia and Denmark.
The Arctic Council
The highest level of international cooperation in the Arctic region is organized by
the Arctic Council. The Council is neither a legislative nor administrative body. Rather, it
functions more as a semi-regular discussion forum on Arctic policy issues. Membership
in the Council is limited to nations with Arctic territory, though a number of indigenous
peoples’ organizations are permanent participants in the council; they may consult with
and work on Council issues, but lack voting rights. 35 An eclectic swath of other states and
intergovernmental organizations has been granted observer status for Arctic Council
proceedings, ranging from Singapore to Spain. The Arctic Council meets biannually to
discuss issues ranging from environmental protection to search and rescue agreements.

33

Gronewold, Nathanial. "A Peek inside the U.N.'s Continental Shelf Commission." The New York Times.
The New York Times Company, 14 Sept. 2009. Web.
34
Gorenburg, Dmitry. "Russian Interests and Policies in the Arctic." War on the Rocks. 7 Aug. 2014. Web.
35
"About the Arctic Council." The Arctic Council. 07 Apr. 2011. Web.
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The structure of the Council is oriented largely towards “The Arctic Five”, the
five nations with a coastal claim to the Arctic Ocean. These nations are Russia, Canada,
Denmark, Norway, and the United States. This arrangement is controversial amongst the
other members of the Arctic Council; frequently the Five break off into separate meetings
to discuss Arctic policy. 36 However, given that the majority of the Arctic Council’s work
is of a largely non-military nature, many of the member nations tend to ignore or
downplay the Council’s significance. As an example of this apathy, the Council operated
for fifteen years before the United States sent a cabinet-level official to any of its
proceedings. The Arctic Council, while important for infrastructural improvement,
environmental protection, and other social concerns, will likely never alter the domestic
policy of Arctic nations.
Scope
This report will focus primarily on the “Arctic Five” (Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Russia, and the United States) and their Arctic policies and postures. Given that these five
nations are coastal Arctic states – that is, their maritime boundaries extend into the Arctic
itself, their postures are most relevant in an American context. Other nations, such as
Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, are indeed Arctic-adjacent nations, but are limited in their
operational capacity due to their geographies, and as such will not be examined. Other
observer states who have tenuous claims to being “Arctic Nations”, such as China and
India, whose northernmost points are still further south than Norway’s southernmost
point, will not be examined due to their tangential connection to the Arctic.

36

Ljunggren, David. "Clinton Rebuke Overshadows Canada's Arctic Meeting." Reuters. Thomson Reuters,
29 Mar. 2010. Web.
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The Russian Federation
Domestic Policy
The Russian government, and its predecessor in the Soviet Union, has always
seen the Arctic as a uniquely Russian space. Many of the geographical features in the
region, including those that are contested by multiple countries, bear the names of
Russian explorers and historical figures. Beyond etymological origins, however, Russia
has staked a firm claim to the majority of the Arctic Ocean. After acceding to the UN
Convention of the Law of the Sea, Russia promptly claimed that its continental shelf – as
part of the Eurasian continent – extended as far as the North Pole, including the
Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge. 37 The CLCS’s judges neither accepted nor
denied the Russian claim, instead requesting more evidence regarding the Russian claim
in the Okhotsk Sea, which Russia provided in February of 2013. The Commission has yet
to decide on the matter of Russia’s Arctic Ocean claims.
This has not prevented Russia from acting in the region. In August of 2007, a
Russian scientific expedition named Arktika 2007 sent manned submersibles to the ocean
floor beneath the North Pole and planted a Russian flag on the seabed. The expedition
generated international outrage –a number of countries saw the incident as tantamount to
Russia claiming the Arctic Ocean and the North Pole without regard for UNCLOS.38
Indeed, the leader of the expedition, Artur Chilingarov himself declared that “The Arctic
is Russian. We must prove the North Pole is an extension of the Russian continental
37

"Submission by the Russian Federation." Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical
Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and
the Law of the Sea: Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 20 Dec. 2001. Web.
38
"Russia Plants Flag on Arctic Floor." CNN. Cable News Network, Turner Broadcasting System, 4 Aug.
2007. Web.
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shelf”. 39 Russian government officials have downplayed such claims, citing the
expedition as a data-collecting excursion to support its CLCS claim. 40
Russia’s Arctic policy is defined by two major documents which define its
general state and maritime policy in the region until 2020. Both documents see securing a
foundation for future natural resource development and maritime shipping activities in
the Russian Arctic zone as their primary focus. 41 While the use of military force to secure
Russian sovereignty is mentioned frequently and described at length in these policy
documents, it is mainly defined in its relation to ensuring the “use of the Arctic zone…as
a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation.” 42 As such, Russian military and
economic developments have not gone further than their current accepted international
boundaries, and are mainly focused inwards, rather than outward.
Economic Considerations
Russia has already begun taking steps to develop the Arctic’s significant natural
resources for itself. In 2013, state-owned energy production company Gazprom started
production in the Prirazlomnoye oil field in Russia’s Pechora Sea, making Russia the first
nation to being offshore oil development in the Arctic. The oil platform used is the first
Arctic ice-resistant oil platform in the world. 43 Gazprom similarly is working to develop
the Shtokman oil field, a large undersea deposit in Russian waters north of the Bay of

39

Reynolds, Paul. "Russia Ahead in Arctic Gold Rush." BBC News. British Broadcasting Corporation, 1
Aug. 2007. Web.
40
"Russia Plants Flag on Arctic Floor." CNN.
41
Klimenko, Ekaterina. Russia’s Evolving Arctic Strategy: Drivers, Challenges and New Opportunities.
Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014. Print. Position Paper 42.
42
Translation from Russian of "Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the
Period Till 2020 and for a Further Perspective" Arctic Resources and Transportation Information System
Knowledge Hub. Centre for High North Logistics, 30 Mar. 2009. Web.
43
"Prirazlomnoye Oil Field." Gazprom Projects. Gazprom. Web.

18

Kola into a production-capable facility by the end of 2015. 44 Russia’s other major oil and
gas companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, similarly are working on accelerating production in
the Arctic, though have yet to progress past the development and prospecting stages. 45
Russia has also been steadily increasing the quality of its Arctic maritime
infrastructure. Presently, the Port of Murmansk is the only Russian port open to yearround operations on the Arctic Ocean. As the anchor of the proposed Northern Sea Route,
the port is undergoing significant reconstruction and expansion of its shipping and
container facilities, as well as its oil and coal terminals. 46 It is also constructing the new
Port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula. The port, which will be completed in 2016, is
meant to facilitate the shipment of oil and gas from the Peninsula through the Northern
Sea Route. 47
Most notable, however, is the quality of Russia’s icebreaking fleet. Presently,
Russian state-owned company Atomflot owns and operates the world’s only six nuclear
icebreakers, and the world’s only nuclear ice-strengthened cargo ship. Atomflot operates
another 12 non-nuclear icebreakers in addition to its nuclear fleet. 48 This capability gives
it a near monopoly on escorting maritime traffic through the Northern Sea Route. These
icebreakers also aid in the construction of oil and gas resource extraction in the Arctic,
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helping escort Gazprom construction crews and material to the Prirazlomnoye oil field. 49
That said, Russian icebreaking capability will diminish over time, as older icebreakers
age out of the fleet. By 2020, only two icebreakers will remain in service – the NS Yamal
and 50 Let Pobedy. Over the next decade, the Russian military does plan to build another
five icebreakers, with an option for a further eight in the future. 50 However, the
icebreakers that were slated for delivery in 2014 and 2015 are in various stages of
production even now, with a new estimated delivery time of 2025 in some cases. Indeed,
even the intervention of Vladimir Putin himself has not helped the situation – though he
announced the construction of the world’s largest icebreaker in 2013, production delays
and cost overruns have resulted in a new anticipated delivery time of 2018 for just the
one icebreaker. 51
Military Capabilities
The icebreaker issue is concerning for Russia’s potential role as a guardian of the
Northern Sea Route. As the most proximate nation to the NSR, Russia bears much of the
burden for search and rescue operations, as well as oil spill response within the route. 52
Problematically for the Russians, the majority of its icebreakers and its patrol vessels are
based with the bulk of the Northern Fleet in the Murmansk region, which is far west of
the beginning of the Northern Sea Route. While Russia has announced the creation of
two land-based Army brigades to be based in Murmansk and Archangelsk to help protect
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the Northern Sea Route, these brigades have been delayed for the past four years, and are
only just now beginning to deploy and receive Arctic training. 53 These units are also
naturally limited by the fact that protection of a maritime shipping route is generally a
task best suited for naval units.
The Russian Military has a clear northern focus in its policy and planning. The
Navy’s Northern Fleet, headquartered near Murmansk, commands two thirds of the
country’s nuclear force, and is larger and more powerful than all of its other three fleets
combined. 54 That said, while Russia’s primary naval assets are indeed based in
Murmansk, they are still hindered by the ice. The Northern Fleet’s three cruisers and six
destroyers have free reign of the northern regions in the summer months, but they lack
operational capacity in the winter. Hypothetically, each of these ships could be escorted
by one of Russia’s numerous icebreakers, but this plan is infeasible, given naval
warfare’s reliance on basic maneuverability. Presently, the only ice-strengthened ships in
the Russian armed forces are the eight Ivan Susanin and Purga-class icebreaker patrol
ships in service with the Russian Maritime Border Guard. Though this outnumbers any
other nations’ icebreaking patrol capacity, these vessels are stretched thin along Russia’s
massive maritime zone of influence, especially given Russia’s need to patrol its nonArctic Pacific Ocean territory and the Baltic Sea.
The Northern Fleet currently operates a number of medium and long-range antisubmarine warfare aircraft, as well as a large number of reconnaissance and patrol
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airframes. 55 While Russia maintains a number of fighter and medium-range bomber
aircraft, they lack the capacity for operations outside of the Russian Arctic, especially
given the current semi-inoperability of the Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft
carrier. 56 Russia’s true operational might in the Arctic comes from its fleet of submarines.
These submarines maintain the capability to retaliate against naval assets in the Arctic, as
well as launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at targets in the continental United States
and mainland Europe. However, here, the ice becomes an issue once again. While ice
provides a crucial amount of cover for submarines evading anti-submarine aircraft or ship
patrols, it also has the potential to physically limit the efficacy of any missile launches,
rendering the submarines somewhat useless. Russia’s newest submarines, the Boreyclass, will deploy in large part to the Northern Fleet. 57
Russia’s main fleet of long-range bombers primarily operates from the Arctic
area. 58 These bombers have been receiving significant in-air time and training recently since the annexation of Crimea, Russian bombers have provoked approximately 40
separate incidents necessitating the scrambling of NATO fighter jets or other defense
apparatuses. 59 Most interestingly, Russia is planning the development and deployment of
a “joint air and air defense army” in the Arctic, along with ten new airfields and radar
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stations along the Arctic Circle. 60 These installations will all fall under the purview of the
new Arctic Joint Strategic Command, which is likely to administer the joint resources of
the Russian North Fleet and any other army or air units needed in the region. 61 Given the
secretive nature of the Russian military structure, it remains unclear as to whether or not
this new command will become another one of Russia’s top-level administrative military
districts, or simply supplement a pre-existing one. 62
Further, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on October 21, 2014
plans to “have a large number of units deployed along the Arctic Circle, practically from
Murmansk to Chukotka”. 63 Though this may have been largely rhetoric – Shoigu’s
remarks were, after all, at a meeting of top-level Russian military officers – they are at
least somewhat mirrored by actual defensive fortification buildups. Recently, Russia
began building two military bases along the Northern Sea Route on Wrangel Island and
Cape Schmidt. 64 The two locations are both proximate to the Bering Sea and functionally
serve as gateways to the eastern Northern Sea Route. The complexes are being built in a
star formation, a modern version of the invasion-proofed trace itaelienne. 65 Russia is also
rebuilding and reopening a number of Cold War-era fortifications, including an airport on
Kotelny Island and an airport in Alakurtti near the Finnish border. 66 In total, the
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Federation’s State Armament Program seeks to build eight nuclear submarines, 600
warplanes, 1,000 helicopters, and 100 naval vessels for addition into the Russian military
by 2020. 67
However, the Russian military’s Arctic focus is greatly hindered by Russia’s
generally dismal military apparatus. While defense spending increased by 500% between
2000 and 2008, the Russian military still lacks the basic infrastructural tools necessary to
bolster its military. 68 The Admiral Kuznetsov is so in need of repairs and retrofit that the
United States Navy’s Sixth Fleet is reputed to have been kept on high alert as the
Kuznetsov sailed to the Mediterranean in 2013 in the event that it sank. 69 Additionally,
diplomatic concerns caused by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have resulted in
the loss of a number of defense deals for the Russian Armed Forces. Russia’s order of
two Mistral-class helicopter carriers, for instance, is on temporary hold until French
government officials approve a hand-over, and German officials have cancelled a $134
million field simulator export project. 70 Corruption frequently plagues the awarding of
military contracts, recruitment, and maintenance, preventing the problem from being
solved simply with additional funding. 71
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Analysis
Russia’s rhetoric and actions in the Arctic region can best be described as
bellicose. Its Deputy Prime Minister recently described the Arctic as “Russian Mecca” 72,
and the aforementioned military buildup in the region point to an aggressive Russian
expansion into the space. This is somewhat true. Russia is certainly increasing its
defensive capabilities in the Arctic space, but this expansion comes in tandem with a
general rise in defense spending and capabilities after the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991. Indeed, Russia’s military expansion in general could instead be termed as a
“return” to military capabilities. Its recent annexation of Crimea, for instance, returns the
peninsula, and crucially the warm-water Port of Sevastopol to Russian control. As stated
above, a majority of the military installations and facilities that Russia is building in the
Arctic are really just reactivations of previous Soviet military bases. Even the Russian
Army’s modernization of its rank system was a return to Soviet military ranks. 73 Further,
while many nations are exploring and considering the prospect of tapping into the
Arctic’s massive oil and gas reserves, Russia’s opening of the Prirazlomnoye oil field is
the first of any such ventures in the world.
This military and economic expansion, however, is neither as threatening nor as
dominant as it seems at first glance. As mentioned above, the Russian military suffers
from massive corruption and inefficiencies, to the point where approximately 20-40% of
Russia’s military hardware budget is stolen by defense officials and contractors
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annually. 74 Supposed Russian naval capabilities have also been marred by a number of
recent Arctic failures. Two submarines, the K-159 and the Kursk, were both lost with all
hands in the Barents Sea, and most Russian vessels have been in service for twenty
years. 75 The aforementioned Ivan Susanin-class icebreaking patrol ships are in a similar
state of affairs as they have been in service since the mid-1970s. Given that the newer
Purga-class patrol ships only serve in the Pacific Fleet, this means that Russia’s Arctic
naval patrol capabilities are much weaker than they are made out to be.
Even Gazprom’s expansion into the Prirazlomnoye oil field is somewhat
asterisked by the fact that it took 20 years and 90 billion rubles ($2.5 billion) to start
operations. 76 Further, Russia lacks the ability to conduct further major exploratory
drilling, given that the only Russian companies able to conduct exploratory drilling –
ArktikmorNeftegazRazvedka (ANR) and Gazprom – own six drilling rigs in total. 77 Of
these, only ANR’s two rigs are meant for offshore use – Gazprom’s four rigs are all landbased drilling rigs currently working in Eastern Siberia. 78 Further, of ANR’s two drilling
rigs, one is under contract for use in Vietnam until 2018, while the other is undergoing
modernization to give it the capacity to be able to drill in Arctic waters. 79 This combined
with the simple fact that Arctic drilling comes with significantly larger (and more
expensive) risk factors, means that Russia lacks the ability to exploit any of the
significant oil and gas resources that lie in the Arctic waters.
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Regardless, the Arctic’s new role as a nascent exploitable resource area and
shipping highway as opposed to a convenient location to store intercontinental ballistic
missiles makes the Russian return to Soviet-level expenditure and attention in the region
particularly salient. Russia is attempting to define the Arctic as a uniquely Russian space
– especially by planting Russian flags at the bottom of the North Pole. However, Russia
defines its military expansion as reactionary, rather than aggressive. In 2014, the Kremlin
released a revised version of its military doctrine that referred to NATO expansion as “a
fundamental threat to Russia”. 80 Indeed, Russian troop mobilizations in the Arctic
recently have been branded by Russian news sources as “responses” to NATO exercises
in the region. 81 Russia presents its expanding role in the Arctic as primarily defensive;
the same military doctrine refers to the “protection” of “Russia’s national interests in the
Arctic”, and all of Russia’s military buildup has been within undisputed Russian territory.
This may seem paradoxical with Russia’s strong interest in international
cooperation in the Arctic. Russian delegates to the Arctic Council, for instance, have been
instrumental in crafting Search and Rescue agreements for the region, and have even
shared the data used for the Russian submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf with other actors. 82 This should not, however, be interpreted as a
newfound Russian respect for international institutions. Instead, Russia’s ability to
exploit any resources in the Arctic beyond those that lie within its Exclusive Economic
Zone is entirely dependent on the adjudication of the CLCS. As such, Russia cannot take
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any actions in the region that would be seen as circumventing the authority of both
bodies, lest it jeopardize its own resources claims in the region.
Canada
Domestic Policy
In 1985, the United States Coast Guard sent one of its icebreakers – the Polar Sea
– through the Northwest Passage on a routine resupply mission. The voyage was
controversial – the US government did not recognize Canada’s claim to the Passage, and
therefore notified, rather than asked, the Canadian government of their plans. This went
over quite poorly with the Canadian public. A national outcry called the American action
a violation of national sovereignty, and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs
Joe Clark stated in Parliament “no icebreaker, even from one of the nations friendliest to
Canada, will come into our territory and try to take our sovereignty away from us”. 83
The dispute was resolved three years later with the Agreement on Arctic
Cooperation, a short, two-paragraph statement that merely stated that its icebreakers
would in future ask for permission from the Canadian government before transiting
“waters claimed by Canada”. 84 The agreement is a minor addition to the litany of
international accords between Canada and the United States. However, it is notable in
that it demonstrates the lengths to which Canada is willing to go to defend its Arctic
sovereignty. Indeed, in 2009, the Parliament of Canada renamed the waterway the
“Canadian Northwest Passage”, and in its Northern Strategy policy document, the
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Canadian government specifically outlined “exercising our Arctic sovereignty” as a top
policy priority in Northern Canada. 85 Canada is committed to ensuring that its slice of the
Arctic – especially the Northwest Passage – remains, and can be defended as,
unequivocally Canadian.
Canada has been defending the Arctic as a Canadian space on the international
stage. Canada was the most vehement objector to the Russian Arktika 2007 expedition,
which planted a Russian flag on the seabed underneath the North Pole. Canadian Foreign
Minister Peter MacKay’s reaction to the expedition was “this isn't the 15th Century…
you can't go around the world and just plant flags and say 'We're claiming this
territory'”. 86 In December 2013, the Canadian government filed a claim with the
UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf staking its claim to a large
portion of the Arctic Ocean. 87 While it has not yet completed the scientific work
necessary to delineate its claims in the Arctic Ocean, the Canadian government plans to
eventually stake a claim on the North Pole and the disputed Lomonosov Ridge with the
CLCS as well. 88 Canada’s claim triggered partial objections from the United States,
Denmark, and France, who all objected to overlaps in claimed territory.
Canada and the United States both dispute their respective maritime borders near
Alaska and Yukon in the Beaufort Sea. Canada claims that the border falls under the
jurisdiction of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which created a maritime boundary
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between then-British Canada and then-Russian Alaska in 1825. However, the United
States claims that maritime boundaries must be equidistant from land boundaries,
resulting in a triangular disputed area. The area is of immense value, potentially holding
1.7 billion cubic meters of gas – enough to supply Canada’s needs for 20 years. 89 While
the dispute is not an intense one, it does have larger implications. Currently, the United
States and Canada are free to solve the issue independently. However, if the United States
were to accede to UNCLOS, the International Tribunal of the UNCLOS would have a
binding judicial mandate on the issue.
Canada and Denmark also dispute the ownership of Hans Island, a small, rocky
outcropping located in between Northern Greenland and Ellesmere Island. The island is
presently of little strategic or resource value, especially given its miniscule size (the
island is approximately half a square mile). The dispute is similarly not an intense one –
neither Canada nor Denmark has devoted many resources to its settlement, and the
argument has been referred to as “one of the world’s friendliest border disputes”. 90
However, as a dispute between two Arctic nations, the issue could set a legal precedent
for future border disputes in the region. If Canada or Denmark were to relinquish its
claim on the island it could be seen as establishing a legal precedent for it giving up other
similar territorial claims in other areas with more resources. 91
The international community and Canada disagree regarding the status of the
Northwest Passage and its potential status as an internal waterway. As outlined in
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UNCLOS, a nation has a claim to administer and regulate all resources and passage
within its internal waters. Foreign vessels do not have the right of transit in these waters,
meaning that Canada potentially has the legal right to limit and regulate passage through
the Northwest Passage. The United States and the European Union hold that the
Northwest Passage qualifies as an international strait – similar to the Straits of Hormuz or
Malacca – and therefore is subject to the UNCLOS guidelines of innocent passage. While
Canada would still have the right to enforce any sort of economic, environmental, and
judicial guidelines, it would not have the right to bar passage to non-military vessels.
Canada, by contrast, holds that the Northwest Passage is internal waters, with its military
referring to the waterway as “Canadian Internal Waters”. 92 The dispute has implications
beyond the lucrative ability to control passage through a global shipping route. Russia
similarly considers aspects of the Northern Sea Route to be within its internal waters; a
decision regarding the Northwest Passage would set a legal precedent for administration
of the Northern Sea Route. 93
Economic Considerations
Canadian exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic is similarly limited by a
strong sense of environmental protectionism within Canada. While the disputed wedge of
ocean in the Beaufort Sea remains untapped due to legal concerns and the hesitancy of
companies to invest in a region that may switch nationalities at any given moment, other
Arctic resources that are undisputedly Canadian are protected by strict environmental
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laws. A significant aspect of the Northern Strategy is the need for environmental
protection in the Arctic. Accordingly, the Canadian Parliament expanded the area
protected by the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970 to include the entirety of
Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone. 94 The act, and its strict environmental regulations,
has largely prevented the expansion of offshore drilling programs in the Arctic area.
Further complicating any Canadian exploitation of Arctic natural resources is the
difficulties associated with offshoring drilling in the Arctic environment. The majority of
Canada’s offshore drilling enterprises ceased in the 1970s, after low production and
increasing costs made the ventures unprofitable. 95 Though American oil company Devon
Energy discovered a sizeable oil field in 2007 in the Beaufort Sea in Canada’s first
drilling operation in, it has not yet been able to extract any oil from the field. 96 A number
of energy companies have applied for permits from the Canadian government to drill in
the Beaufort Sea, but Canada’s National Energy Board has yet to approve the permits
necessary to begin drilling.
Military Capabilities
Canada’s Arctic military presence, however, currently lags behind its rhetoric. At
present, for instance, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) operates primarily in
Southern Canada, with only four northern “Forward Operating Locations” (FOLs) that
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are host to four small search and rescue (SAR) airframes. 97 While the FOLs were built to
house Canadian F-18s if necessary, jets dedicated to maintaining Canadian air
sovereignty – especially from Russian Arctic aerial activity – are still stationed in southCentral and southeastern Canada. While its military receives cold weather training and
basic instruction in Arctic warfare, its primary force in the region are the Canadian
Rangers, a volunteer group made up primarily of Canada’s Inuit, First Nations, and Métis
populations that still uses World War Two era equipment for surveillance operations.
To help improve Canada’s Arctic military presence, the Canadian Ministry of
Defence adopted the “Canada First Defence Strategy” in 2008. The strategy is a lengthy
policy document that lists “Conduct[ing] daily domestic and continental operations…in
the Arctic” as its first priority through 2028. 98 Accordingly, in 2010, Prime Minister
Stephen Harper’s government announced its intention to replace Canada’s 80 F-18s with
65 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, though amidst domestic controversy, no deal has yet been
signed. 99 The RCAF also operates 18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft in the
Arctic, which will be replaced with 10-12 new airframes by 2020. 100 These additions will
add to Canada’s early warning and signal intelligence capabilities in the Arctic. Currently
these roles are filled by the NORAD North Warning System – a system of 15 long-range
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radars in northern North America – and Canadian Forces Station, Alert; an early warning
base on the tip of Ellesmere Island. 101
Canada’s Defence First budget similarly outlines special expenditures for the
modernization of its naval assets. The budget specifically mentions the purchase of 6-8
Arctic/offshore patrol ships by the Royal Canadian Navy to supplement the new ASW
airframes purchased by the RCAF. 102 Construction on the ships will begin in September
of 2015. 103 The Canadian Navy similarly has begun construction on an Arctic refueling
port for its vessels on Baffin Island, which would be the only Canadian facility of its kind
within the Arctic Circle. The facility, which was originally slated to be a fully functional
deep-water port, would serve to refuel Arctic patrols by 2018. 104
Analysis
Canadian Arctic rhetoric and militarization demonstrates Canada’s strong desire
to demarcate the Arctic – or at least its most lucrative parts – as Canadian territory.
Though much of Canada’s military buildup in the Arctic is still in the planning stages – it
will be many years before F-35s begin using FOL Yellowknife as bases from which to
patrol the Arctic – the military buildup is a huge difference from years past. Canada’s
military involvement in the Arctic was formerly limited to its joint partnership with the
United States in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and
intercepting Soviet bombers off their northern coast. However, the rapid buildup of their
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naval and aviation assets in the Arctic indicates a Canadian desire to match the opening
of the Arctic with an ability to police their section of it.
Canadian Arctic ambitions, however, are somewhat tempered by the fact that the
Northwest Passage is much slower to open to maritime traffic than the rest of the Arctic.
By 2030, for instance, the NWP will only be somewhat free of sea ice for 11 weeks per
year, in contrast to Russia’s Northern Sea Route, which will face similar conditions for
19 weeks per year. Further, while there is a significant Russian population within the
Arctic Circle that lives on the Northern Sea Route, 90% of Canadians live within 100
miles of the border with the United States, meaning that Canada lacks an existing urban
infrastructure in its Arctic environment. 105
It is unclear what actual strategic effect the Canadian military expansion may be
able to have in the region. Whereas Russia’s major regional issue is an absence of
military capacity in its Arctic zone, the Canadian military may face an issue in which
their military expansion is ineffective. Canadian government officials have criticized the
acquisition of the new Arctic patrol ships as they may be too small and underpowered to
be suitable for heavy icebreaking. 106 Other Canadian officials are unhappy with the fact
that the patrol vessel acquisition comes under the control of the Canadian Navy, feeling
instead that they should have been purchased on behalf of the Canadian Coast Guard.107
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Given the fact that the ships have yet to be acquired, the inter-service squabble leaves the
status of these ships in limbo.
As much as Canada’s rhetoric may be centered on the primacy of its claim in the
Arctic and its ownership of the Northwest Passage, it is still a key partner with the United
States in major international affairs. Both Canada and the United States are members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), meaning that they share a strong
commitment to each other’s political and defense enterprises. The militaries conduct
joint-military exercises and cooperate with each other in policy creation and defense
planning, meaning that, despite chest-thumping rhetoric from Ottawa regarding the
Northwest Passage and the dispute over the Beaufort wedge, the United States and
Canada can be counted on as strong Arctic partners. Indeed, when referring to other
nations in the Arctic, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development
specifically refers to the United States as Canada’s “premier partner”, indicating that the
only sticking point in the US-Canada Arctic relationship is the Northwest Passage and the
Beaufort wedge. 108 As the United States builds its own independent military capacity in
the Arctic, it is doing so in conjunction, rather than competition with Canadian efforts.
The Kingdom of Denmark
Domestic Policy
A discussion of Arctic policy for most nations usually begins with an analysis of
their military buildup and capabilities in the region. Both Canada and Russia, for
instance, have Arctic policies that are characterized by their drastic growth in Arctic
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military capability. Interestingly, however, Denmark’s primary concerns in the Arctic
seem to be its sustainability and environmental quality. In a speech at Dartmouth College,
for instance, the Danish Ambassador to the United States, Peter Taksoe-Jensen stated that
the best approach to the Arctic moving forward is “to actually have a framework where
we can manage the challenges and opportunities by working together”. 109
This is not mere rhetoric – Denmark’s claim to the Arctic comes from its
administration of Greenland, where native Greenlanders comprise 89% of the island’s
population. Denmark’s relationship with Greenland is unique – though Greenland is an
autonomous country with its own government, parliament, and a legally distinct
populace, Denmark is largely responsible for administration of the island, and has
oversight over the Greenlander people. 110 Greenlanders are traditionally wary of external
forces dictating native policy. A 1953 expansion of the United States’ Thule Air Force
Base, for instance, resulted in the forced removal of an entire Greenlander village with
four days of notice. Though the agreement has since been amended to guarantee Danish
and Greenlander oversight over American military activities on the island, the base
expansion continues to be a sore subject for Greenlanders, who continue to file lawsuits
in the Danish Supreme Court and protest the base’s existence. 111 More recently, the
Premier of Greenland boycotted a meeting of the Arctic Council in protest of the fact that
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Greenland lacks a voting role on the Council. 112 As such, Denmark must maintain a
special focus on the needs and desires of the Greenlander people, lest it lose its only
connection to the Arctic by alienating a population that is legally and culturally distinct
from its own. Its public strategy document outlining its approach to the Arctic between
2011 and 2020 demonstrates as much – it is signed as a multilateral directive between the
governments of Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland.
Accordingly, Denmark leads the field in ensuring the continued “sustainable
growth and social sustainability” of the Arctic. 113 Its Arctic policy document, for
instance, outlines a number of mandatory systems that it has adopted or is in the process
of adopting to improve maritime safety and reduce shipping accidents. This appears to be
a higher priority than military expansion (detailed below), especially given that subjects
such as maritime safety, ecology, and native peoples’ rights form the bulk of the policy
document, whereas military maneuvers and strategy are given a vague and obtuse three
pages.
Denmark is attempting to partner with several nations, beyond the obvious
military partnership with NATO and the United States, due to the latter’s military
presence in Greenland, to achieve the above goals. It is leading the charge within the
International Maritime Organization to create more stringent and effective shipping laws,
and mandates that all vessels sailing to Greenland report their location at all times in a
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GPS-based monitoring system to prevent accidents. 114 Internally, Denmark is partnering
with Russia to help chart unmapped areas of the ocean floor between Greenland and
Russia. 115
This is not to say that Denmark lacks unilateral interests. In December of 2014, it
– similar to Russia and Canada – submitted a claim to the Lomonosov Ridge to the UN
Commission on the Laws of the Continental Shelf. 116 While the Commission has yet to
pass any form of judgment on the Danish claim, its acceptance would mean that Denmark
would exercise near-total control over the Arctic region, especially due to its adjoining
claim of the area east of Greenland.
Economic Considerations
Denmark’s potential economic advantages from the Arctic come largely from its
association with Greenland. Greenland possesses vast oil and gas resources off its Eastern
coast – a United States Geological Survey study estimated the East Greenland Rift Basin
area to have some of the largest reserves of oil in the world. 117 Danish energy interests
have a newly increased interest in tapping into these fields, especially as production from
the Danish North Sea diminishes annually since peaking in 2005. 118 Problematically,
however, for Danish drilling ventures in the region, the East Greenland Rift Basin is
plagued by consistent Arctic ice, with the majority of the area being encapsulated within
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the standard Arctic ice extent annually. 119 One region in Greenland, the West Disko tract,
remains ice-free year-round and a potential source of cheap Greenlandic resource
extraction. 120 Danish resource development in the Arctic region has also been delayed by
the fall in the price of oil, and is unlikely to return unless the price of oil rebounds to a
high enough point where profits will justify investment.
There are political obstacles to resource extraction in Greenland as well. While all
offshores resources are in the Danish Exclusive Economic Zone, the government of
Greenland retains ultimate control of all resource exploration licenses in the region,
which has led to confusion in the region. Greenland’s government, for instance, placed a
moratorium on oil drilling in 2013 to the dismay of the Danish government, only to
reverse its position in order to utilize revenues from oil and gas development in order to
gain more financial independence. 121 This, in conjunction with environmental difficulties,
has left the region underdeveloped.
Military Capabilities
Similarly, Denmark is not shying away from military expansion in the region,
especially in Greenland. It recently decided to combine its military commands in
Greenland and the Faroe Islands into one unified Arctic Command in order to streamline
and create a unified military structure in the Arctic region. 122 This command’s main role
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thus far has been “upgrading…to support the planning and execution of major operations,
as in connection with the deployment of an Arctic preparedness force.” 123 This ‘Arctic
preparedness force’ is also a new military expansion intended specifically to be a rapid
response force for “enforcement of sovereignty and surveillance” of Danish territories
while maintaining the ability to partner with other external NATO forces in the region. 124
These structural expansions bolster an extant military defense network based in
Greenland. At present, Denmark’s Arctic military presence is minimal, especially
considering that it has only been mentioned in defense planning documents since 2010.
The longest operating permanent military presence in the region, for instance is provided
by Slædepatrulje Sirius, a unit of 14 Danish soldiers who ride around Northeastern
Greenland on dogsleds conducting sovereignty enforcement patrols for months at a
time. 125 Of additional note is Station Nord, a five-person scientific station in Northeastern
Greenland that is the second-most northern permanent settlement in the world. 126 Beyond
this, the recently established Arctic Command has a small administrative presence in
Nuuk, Greenland, and a liaison unit with the American military base at Thule. 127
Denmark has recently realigned a portion of its air assets to have a permanent
Arctic presence. Whereas Air Group West, which hosts Denmark’s F-16 fighter jets, only
used Kangerlussuaq Airport in Western Greenland for temporary stopovers and training
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exercises in the past, it now maintains a permanent presence there. 128 Additional
maritime patrol craft also operate in the Arctic from Aalborg Air Base in mainland
Denmark. While Thule Air Force Base is a United States military asset, the Danish
military retains the ability to station troops and air assets there, if necessary. 129
Denmark’s naval capabilities are more robust than its air or land divisions. The
Royal Danish Navy maintains an active naval base in southern Greenland – Kanginnguit.
From Kanginnguit, the Danish Navy conducts regular sovereignty patrols within the
Arctic space with its three specially built ice-hardened Knud Rasmussen class “Inspection
Ships”. 130 These ships are specifically meant for Arctic patrols off the coast of
Greenland, and to replace Denmark’s three ice-strengthened cutters (of which one
remains in service in Greenland). 131 There are currently two Knud Rasmussen class
vessels in service, with a third planned to enter service by 2017.
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These patrol ships all

will serve as platforms for the Danish Navy’s nine Sikorsky Seahawks, which have the
capability to conduct anti-surface and submarine warfare, search and rescue, and general
surveillance. 133 The Danish Navy similarly has four Thetis class frigates meant to
resupply Danish forces in Greenland and work as light icebreakers. 134 Finally, the Navy
operates two medium icebreakers primarily for research and resupply operations
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Analysis
The nuances of the Denmark-Greenland relationship complicate Denmark’s
Arctic aspirations. As stated above, Greenlandic politics led to a temporary moratorium
on Arctic drilling which was only lifted to reduce Greenlandic reliance on Danish
monetary aid. Corporate hesitancy over drilling in Greenland goes further than questions
over politics; a recent fall in oil prices has made companies reluctant to invest the
massive amounts of capital required to start production in the ice-filled waters in
Greenland, with some even returning the their offshore exploration licenses. 135 Danish
Arctic military expansion is couched in a desire to protect Greenland’s Arctic resources
and help police its Arctic claims. The expansion, however, is controversial, even within
the ranks of the Danish military. In a strongly-worded rebuke of Denmark’s military
expansion, the former Commander of the Danish Greenlandic Command notes that
Denmark’s peace with the other Arctic nations – as he puts it, “the closest the Kingdom
of Denmark has been to getting into a territorial conflict since 1864 [was when] the
Canadian military removed a Danish flag from Hans Island”. 136
The Kingdom of Norway
Domestic Policy
Norway’s Arctic regions have been at the forefront of its government policy
focuses since the country’s modern inception in 1905. Its northernmost county of
Finnmark has always been a front-line against Russian and Soviet incursions and its
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administration of the archipelago of Svalbard was the subject of international debate and
a treaty involving a litany of countries in 1920. These characteristics make Norway’s
relationship with the Arctic unique – whereas many nations are only now discovering the
value of their Arctic connection, the Norwegians have always been cognizant and closely
connected to the Arctic. Indeed, most government documents refer to the Finnmark,
Svalbard, and the island of Jan Meyen as “The High North” or simply “North Norway”.
Despite this, however, Norway’s Arctic sovereignty is tenuous and limited.
Though its administration of Finnmark and the associated Exclusive Economic Zone is
unmistakable given its contiguity with the rest of the country, Svalbard is the subject of a
nearly century-old treaty that severely limits Norway’s capability to use the archipelago
as a base for future Arctic operations. For much of Svalbard’s (then referred to as
Spitsbergen) history, the archipelago was terra nullus – a land without a nation. 137 Over
time, numerous international interests began using the archipelago as a base of operations
for whaling, coaling, and Arctic exploration, creating the need for some form of
governance. The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty placed Svalbard under Norwegian
administration, but preserved the terra nullus rights of signatory nations.
While the area is completely under Norwegian control, Norway must allow any
treaty nation to become residents of the archipelago and undertake any form of
commercial or mining activity they desire. 138 Further, it is prohibited from establishing
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“any naval base [or]…fortification in the said territories…for warlike purposes”. 139 The
treaty has created an odd situation for the Norwegian government today, wherein it is
responsible for the upkeep and preservation of a Russian mining settlement, Barentsburg,
on its own sovereign territory without being able to use it for non-commercial purposes.
Russia continues to prove the point that Svalbard is not under Norway’s sovereign
control – Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin visited the archipelago in April
of 2015, despite having travel sanctions placed on him by the European Union and
Norway. 140
The Treaty of Svalbard also leaves the archipelago open to foreign construction
and presence. In 2014, a Chinese businessman proposed buying a large tract of land on
the main island for “business purposes”. 141 The Chinese have also attempted to create a
large radar installation on Svalbard in the past, though this attempt has been repeatedly
rebuffed by the Norwegian government. In Ny-Ålesund, a research town in northwestern
Svalbard, ten different countries, ranging from China and India to Japan and South
Korea, conduct unfettered scientific research on the archipelago. 142
This multilateralism is mirrored on a larger diplomatic stage. For example, in
2010, Norway and Russia resolved a forty-year maritime border dispute in the Barents
Sea, and have participated in a fisheries management program in the Barents Sea since
1976. Most incredibly for a border zone that was once the dividing line of the NATO-
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USSR conflict; Norwegian authorities have proposed a special ID for border region
residents allowing them to cross the border without visas and in an expedited manner. 143
The relationship has been strained recently, with Norway suspending bilateral military
activities with Russia due to the annexation of Crimea. 144 Beyond Russia, Norway has
hosted five different “Cold Response” military exercises simulating a hypothetical
military conflict in a cold weather scenario. These exercises are open to NATO member
states, and have been held semi-regularly since 2006. 145 Further, under former Prime
Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s Secretary Generalship of NATO, Norway has begun to host
more NATO military exercises, with a new “high-visibility” exercise scheduled for 2018.
This has not prevented Norway from attempting to ensure the sovereignty of
Svalbard and its other Arctic holdings. In the 2007 Soria Moria Declaration, the
Norwegian government declared the High North as “Norway’s most important strategic
target area in the years to come”. 146 This emphasis on Arctic operations is visible with the
move of the Norwegian Defence Headquarters, the Norwegian Coast Guard’s
headquarters, and major elements of the Norwegian Army to bases north of the Arctic
Circle. 147 On a political side, Norway has filed two submissions with the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming the “Southern Banana
Hole” and the “Loop Hole”, two swaths of ocean surrounding Svalbard. These claims are
somewhat controversial – the 1920 Treaty of Svalbard did not clarify the status of the
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waters surrounding the archipelago, and as such Norway’s claim has come under
additional scrutiny.
Economic Considerations
Norway’s economy is largely based on natural resource development in the North
Sea. It generates massive state revenues from its North Sea extraction; to the point there it
has created a sovereign wealth fund to fund Norwegian social programs entirely from
petroleum revenue. 148 Additionally, Norway’s position near the Barents Sea makes it
well-placed to take advantage of the natural resources in the area. It is currently
developing a liquefied natural gas plant on the island of Melkøya to harvest the massive
natural gas reserves of the Snøhvit field. The Snøhvit operation is the first of its kind in
the Barents Sea. 149 Norway’s state-owned petroleum enterprise, Statoil, has drilled over
100 exploration wells in the Barents Sea, and plans even more for the future. 150 Until
recently, however, Norway did not allow the exploitation of Barents Sea resources, citing
environmental concerns in the region. 151 Given potentially diminishing returns in the
North Sea, Norway is seeking to invest more in the Barents region, opening its first round
of exploitation and production licenses in 2016. 152
Military Capabilities
Norway’s army, while small, is primarily oriented towards Arctic operations. Its
one army brigade – Brigade Nord (North) – is stationed north of the Arctic Circle in
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Troms County, and conducts Arctic training exercises frequently, as in the
aforementioned Cold Response NATO exercise. 153 However, the military lacks the
capability to enforce and patrol the large Arctic claims it has promulgated. While the Air
Force has 60 F-16 fighter jets – with 56 F-35s on order, these aircrafts’ capabilities are
largely neutered given the Air Force’s lack of tanker aircraft that would allow them to
patrol outside of mainland Norway. 154 Additionally, its P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft
are few and in need of replacement –a recent refurbishment added 20-25 years to their
service life, but the fact that there are only six airframes in service limits their
capability. 155
The Norwegian Navy and Coast Guard similarly face an Arctic capabilities gap.
Only one of its naval ships – the NoCGV Svalbard, possesses the ability to break the ice.
The rest of its naval fleet is comprised of five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates which are
neither ice-strengthened nor generally functional. A number of the frigates have been
berthed at length due to a lack of spare parts, and one has been partially cannibalized in
order to have its parts sent to the other frigates. 156 Despite the problems, these frigates are
intended to operate within the entire Norwegian operating space, Arctic or otherwise. The
Navy additionally operates six Ula-class submarines, which have a similar, limited,
Arctic capability. 157 The Navy plans the purchase of a large logistics support ship in

153

"Brigade Nord." Forsvaret Norge. Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Web.
"Norway Re-Winging, Refurbishing Its P-3 Orions." Defense Industry Daily. Defense Industry Daily, 4
Mar. 2014. Web.
155
Wezeman, Siemon T. "Military Capabilities in the Arctic."
156
Berglund, Nina. "Frigate Berthed for Its Spare Parts." News In English.no. 30 Sept. 2013. Web.
157
Wezeman, Siemon T. "Military Capabilities in the Arctic."
154

48

order to facilitate future Arctic operations, as well as supplement the operational
capabilities of the Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates. 158
Analysis
Norway is in a unique situation amongst the Arctic nations. Due to its
administration of Svalbard, it finds itself forced to accept other countries using territory it
administers as a base of operations for their own Arctic expansion. Norway also is legally
limited in its response – while it may want to protect Norwegian interests on Svalbard
with a local military buildup, it is prohibited from doing so by the Spitsbergen Treaty. As
such Norwegian military expansion must be done from their own mainland, without
using the advantages of the Arctic territory it possesses. Notably, however, it is perfectly
able to patrol and maintain its Barents Sea holdings, considering its proximity to the
Norwegian mainland.
Curiously, Norway’s military capacity in the Arctic is limited by more than just
international law. Even though Norway is a strong NATO partner with a strong public
opinion of the military, Norway’s military capacity in the region is severely limited. 159 Its
navy especially is in huge need of improvements and addition, considering the significant
amount of Arctic coastline that it has. Currently, as seen by the flawed acquisition of the
Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, Norway has a weak navy that lacks the capacity to protect
its own Arctic holdings and potentially deter its eastern neighbor, Russia.
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CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Domestic Policy and Posture
The United States lacks a clear direction and vision for its Arctic future. Thus far,
there have been only three governmental policy statements on the region. The first, a
Nixon-era memorandum, proposed a few platitudes regarding international cooperation
and established the Interagency Arctic Policy Group, a group meant to coordinate and
advise implementation of US Arctic policy. 160 Since 1990, this group has been limited to
defining and implementing scientific research in the Arctic. 161
The next document, a Presidential Directive authorized by President George W.
Bush in the last few days of his presidency, continues to be the most substantive Arctic
policy statement issued by the US to date. The directive, referred to as NSPD-66,
affirmed the United States’ need to accede to UNCLOS, but more crucially rejected the
concept of an independently negotiated treaty for the Arctic region, similar to the
Antarctic. 162 The Antarctic treaty prevents any nations other than those who already had
territorial claims to the Antarctic at the time of the treaty’s signing from establishing any
new territorial claims to the Antarctic. 163 As such, given the United States has not
acceded to UNCLOS and has no legal claim to any Arctic maritime zones, an Arctic
Treaty in the pattern of the Antarctic treaty could permanently lock the United States out
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of the Arctic. The document also defines the Northwest Passage and parts of the Northern
Sea Route as international straits as defined by UNCLOS, something that contradicts the
Arctic policies of Canada and Russia respectively.
The following document, the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, is a brief
document from the administration of President Barack Obama that largely reaffirms the
statements made in NSPD-66, while adding a minimal amount of substance to certain
environmental guidelines. 164 As such, American Arctic policy continues to be defined by
a presidential directive authorized by a President eleven days from the end of his term.
President Obama authorized an Executive Order in January of 2015 authorizing the
creation of an Arctic Executive Steering Committee to provide guidance and coordination
between executive departments and agencies, the Alaskan government, tribal
stakeholders, and other Alaskan Native organizations in Arctic policy. 165 This Committee
is still in the planning process, and has not yet formally convened. 166
At present, American accession to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea is
largely blocked by domestic political concerns. Accession has large bipartisan and
multilateral support, with both Presidents Bush and Obama in favor of American
ratification, as well as former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, former Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin
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Dempsey. 167 Opposition to the treaty comes from Senate Republicans, who see the
convention as infringing upon the national sovereignty of the United States – even
referring to the treaty as LOST (Law of the Sea Treaty) as opposed to UNCLOS. 168
Curiously, the opposition to UNCLOS after its initial publication was only concerned
with Article XI of the treaty, which gives the International Seabed Authority (ISA) the
right to distribute mining rights from waters outside of any one nation’s territory. 169 After
renegotiating the agreement to allow the United States a permanent seat on the governing
council of the ISA, a move that would have allowed effective US veto power over any
redistribution agreements, the United States signed the treaty and recognized the
convention as international law. However, Senate refusal to ratify the treaty means that
the protections and rights afforded to UNCLOS members are still not extended to the
United States.
Within the State Department, the Arctic continues to be a low priority. Internally,
the office responsible for handling Arctic issues is nestled within a series of different
offices that report to the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and
Environment, rather than the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who normally is
responsible for diplomatic affairs. This does, however, appear to be changing. In 2014,
Secretary of State John Kerry appointed retired Coast Guard Admiral Robert Papp to
serve as the United States Special Representative for the Arctic. In this role, the admiral
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has begun meeting with various stakeholders in the Arctic Council in preparation for the
recent US assumption of the Arctic Council chairmanship. As the United States’ Senior
Arctic Official (SAO), Papp will be responsible for administering the Council and
representing the interests of the United States in its proceedings.
Economic Considerations
As with any other Arctic nation, the United States has much to gain economically
in the Arctic. Even though the only Arctic shipping route that the United States has
access to is the Bering Strait (which it jointly administers with Russia), it stands to gain
massive returns from

natural

resource extraction. On land, natural resources fall into the

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), a protected zone where drilling or other
resource development is completely forbidden. Offshore, the typical Arctic mélange of
problems exist – ranging from expensive infrastructural investments to the difficulty of
drilling in Arctic weather conditions. Currently, no offshore drilling rigs exist in the
Arctic, though Shell Oil plans to resume drilling in the Beaufort Sea two years after a
series of minor accidents in the Arctic.
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region places an emphasis on “responsibly
develop[ing] Arctic oil and gas resources”, which is reflected in recently adopted
landmark federal regulations for Arctic drilling. Notably, however, there are not vast
reserves of oil and gas immediately available to American energy interests. The ANWR
only holds enough oil to supply the United States for a year, and the international legal
dispute over the Beaufort Wedge means that no company is willing or able, to attempt to
extract the resources below. Further, access to potential oil reserves further afield is
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made difficult by the lack of domestic icebreaking capacity – if oil exists, there is
currently no way for American drilling operations to access it.
Military Strategy and Policy
The United States’ military has a large and visible trajectory in the Arctic. In
November of 2013, the Department of Defense published its Arctic Strategy brief, which
outlined the US military’s general approach to the Arctic. The Department divides the
territory between the United States Northern Command and its European Command
(NORTHCOM and EUCOM, respectively), though NORTHCOM’s commander “is
responsible for advocating for Arctic capabilities”. 170 This designates the Commander of
NORTHCOM as the military counterpart to the US Special Representative to the Arctic,
and creates a leadership structure for the region. The brief further states that the
Department will conduct periodic re-evaluations of Arctic operational requirements for
all relevant commands, and seek to modify and improve existing infrastructure where
possible. Regardless of the timeline, the Department will seek to ensure and secure an
American Arctic presence with any means necessary –surface, submarine, or aerial.
Notably, however, the brief strays away from defining any specific timelines or objective
goals for the region, recognizing that projections about the Arctic ice melt may vary
greatly from year to year, and that fiscal constraints – especially following the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, prevent a full-fledged engagement of the Arctic region.
Presently, the United States Air Force is the most visible of the United States’
Arctic military forces. The Air Force maintains two large bases in Alaska – Eilsen Air
Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf. The former, which was reduced in size and scope
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after 2005, supports a fighter wing and an Alaskan Air National Guard refueling wing. 171
Joint Base Elmendorf, by contrast, is home to 12,000 military personnel and the entirety
of the Eleventh Air Force, comprised of fighter, airlift, and other support capacity. The
Eleventh Air Force similarly supports a number of radar and early warning installations
located throughout Alaska as part of NORAD’s extensive radar network. 172 The Air
Force continues to maintain a number of air bases and runway facilities throughout
Alaska that were drawn down after the Cold War but retain the capacity to support future
Arctic aviation capability beyond Eilsen and Elmendorf. 173 Outside of Alaska, the Air
Force maintains a sizeable presence at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland. While Thule
no longer has an active air wing located at the base, it still retains the facilities necessary
for long-range maritime patrol and bomber aircraft, as well as the world’s northernmost
deep-water port. 174 The Air Force similarly maintains the institutional understanding and
knowledge necessary for Arctic operations through its support operations for its research
stations in Greenland. 175
Notably, however, the military in general lacks significant long-range maritime
patrol capability in the Arctic. A small portion of the military’s HC-130 search and
rescue aircraft operate from Coast Guard Station Kodiak Island and Elmendorf, in
addition to a few E-3 early warning radar aircraft from Elmendorf. As such, the US
military is entirely dependent on ground-based early warning systems leftover in the area
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from the Cold War. Additionally, there are no anti-submarine/surface warfare airframes
in Alaska or Greenland.
American naval priorities in the Arctic are defined by the US Navy’s Arctic
Roadmap 2014-2030, which outlines the Navy’s long-term plans in the Arctic operating
space. A key portion of the Roadmap is a lengthy study detailing the potential
navigability of the Arctic Ocean in the decades to come. The report is rather bearish on
the potential for increased Arctic shipping, noting that it would likely take until 2030 for
there to be significant open water in all four of the major Arctic shipping routes. 176 Even
then, the routes will only be open for a fraction of the year, with significant amounts of
shoulder ice even in the summer season. The Navy’s ability to patrol in these straits,
however, is largely limited by their international legal status. If, as Canada holds in the
case of the Northwest Passage, and Russia in the case of the Northern Sea Route, these
straits are internal or territorial waters, then the US Navy would lack the legal right to
transit or patrol these waters, rendering the discussion of US naval preparedness in the
area moot. As mentioned previously, this discussion has been the root of diplomatic
conflict between the United States in Canada previously, though the situation remains
unresolved.
American naval capability is limited even within domestic waters. While the
Navy has standard operating capacity south of the Bering Strait, it loses operational
capacity in ice-infested waters. None of the US Navy’s surface ships are currently icestrengthened, meaning that they will not be able to operate in or north of the Bering Strait
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for half of the year, even in 2030.177 Further, naval capabilities are limited by a lack of
port facilities in the Arctic region. While Thule AFB maintains a deep-water port, there
are no similar facilities in the Alaskan Arctic. Currently, there are plans to expand the
Port of Nome to be able to accommodate larger ships, but neither the Navy nor the Coast
Guard has announced plans to place a facility there. 178
There is, of course, the much ballyhooed question of the United States’ icebreaker
fleet, or lack thereof. Currently, the United States Coast Guard only operates three
icebreakers, the USCGC Polar Sea, Polar Star, and Healy. These icebreakers are
generally in limited condition. The Polar Star, for instance, was out of commission
between 2006 and 2012 while waiting for funding for repairs to its engines. Even after
the repairs were funded in 2010, Admiral Papp (who was Admiral of the Coast Guard at
that point) was “uncertain” as to the potential future life of the vessel. 179 The Polar Sea is
currently out of service, and is in limbo, as parts were stripped from it to facilitate the
Polar Star’s refit, and Congress has yet to decide on whether or not to fund repairs or
decommission the ship entirely. The Healy has only been in service for fifteen years, but
has lower icebreaking ability than its larger siblings. A fourth icebreaker serves with the
National Science Foundation, but is only able to support Antarctic research. 180
However, this does not imply that the United States lacks the ability to facilitate
its current icebreaking needs. Currently, the Polar Star and the Healy are used on
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research patrols and to rescue the occasional abandoned ship in the Arctic or Antarctic. 181
US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is also able to support the annual
strategic sealift necessary to resupply Thule AFB with its ice-class general cargo ship and
its ice-class tanker. 182 Further, given the scarce population in Northern Alaska, there is no
civilian need for icebreakers to resupply Arctic Alaskan communities. These
communities are instead served by regularly scheduled air service and access facilitated
by the Pan-American Highway. By contrast, rural communities in Russia are spread out
and lack airport facilities, necessitating resupply by sea. 183
A bright spot for US naval capabilities in the Arctic continues to be the operation
capabilities of its nuclear submarine fleet. The Navy conducts regular submarines patrols
under the Arctic, frequently surfacing through thick ice at the North Pole. 184 The Navy
similarly has eleven SSBNs stationed at Naval Base Kitsap in Washington State, giving
the Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet quick and easy access to the Arctic operating
environment. Given the nature of submarines, they are not limited by weather conditions,
and can operate under the ice year-round. 185 To further the capabilities of American
submarines operating underneath the Arctic surface, the Navy operates an Arctic
Submarine Laboratory in San Diego, California. 186 Additionally, US Naval forces
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conduct a semi-annual Ice Exercise (ICEX) in the Arctic to test submarine operations and
tactics in conjunction with surface warfare requirements. 187
Whatever further steps are taken to bolster US military efforts in the Arctic will
be complemented by a wealth of internal planning and military simulations. The
aforementioned military shortcomings became readily apparent after the US Naval War
College conducted the Fleet Operations Arctic Game in 2011 to simulate responses to a
number of different potential scenarios in an Arctic becoming more widely trafficked.188
Further, the US military plans and executes a number of war simulations and field
training exercises in the Alaskan Arctic environment annually, including the semiannual
RED FLAG-Alaska, and the annual Northern Edge exercise. 189 Northern Edge in
particular is a joint training exercise, allowing the Navy and the Air Force to gain
valuable institutional knowledge about Arctic operations.
Key Findings
Based on the previous findings and information, the following observations about the
Arctic can be made:
1. The United States lacks a concerted policy direction and goals for its role in the
Arctic
Each of the other major Arctic nations has a detailed public policy document
outlining their general goals and visions for the Arctic operating space. These documents
include everything from military strategies, affirmations of certain national beliefs, and a
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vision for the nations’ roles in the Arctic moving forward. The United States lacks such a
document, and the close approximations that it does have – NSPD 66 and the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region – have led to a holding pattern for US Arctic policy.
Specific stakeholders within the United States are developing their own discrete Arctic
policies, as evidenced by the Arctic policies of the State Department, Department of
Defense, and the US Navy. However, a lack of top-level policy direction – created by
either Congress or the Executive Branch – is hindering any US progress on the Arctic
issue. Key policy holes identified by each of the aforementioned stakeholders cannot be
filled without the approval or buy-in of either Congress or the Executive, and as such,
these branches cannot act on the shortcomings that they discover.
2. The United States is at an international legal disadvantage in regards to securing
its Arctic claims as a result of it not acceding to the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea
Functionally, the United States abides by the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea. However, even though it has signed the document, the fact that it has not acceded to
the Convention means that the United Nations will not protect American maritime
interests – especially in the Arctic. Even though the United States considers a large swath
of the Arctic as its own territory, this claim cannot and will not be defended by
international law given the United States’ non-participation in UNCLOS. As such, the
United States faces a situation in which the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf makes decisions on Arctic maritime boundaries that do not consider American
interests. Considering that the Convention has been amended to consider, and be
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favorable to, American interests, it is foolhardy for the United States to continue to be the
only Arctic nation that is not a party to the Convention.
3. The United States Navy is at a severe relative operating deficiency in the Arctic
due to top-level dithering on Arctic issues
Currently, American operational influence in the region is limited by a total lack
of naval resources. The Navy can only patrol north of the Bering Strait when it is free of
ice, and lacks the ability to conduct long-range maritime patrols over the territory that it
is tasked with defending. While SSBNs and attack submarines maintain a powerful and
convincing dominance under the Arctic seas, above, American naval power is nowhere to
be found. In the event of an oil spill, humanitarian disaster, or foreign incursion,
American military power will be either incumbent on its aging and decrepit trio of
icebreakers or on foreign aid. While Canada, the United States’ closest ally is preparing
its own military in a way that will allow it to defend its own Arctic holdings, continued
and protracted diplomatic irritations over the Northwest Passage and Beaufort Wedge
prevent the guarantee that Canada will be as supportive of the United States in the Arctic
as it is elsewhere. Though the Navy is well aware of their operating limits within the
Arctic and the steps necessary to fix the problem, Congressional and Executive inaction
means that these solutions cannot be pursued.
4. Alarm over foreign Arctic military buildups – especially that of Russia – is
misplaced
While each of the other Arctic nations is investing large amounts of capital into
their Arctic operational capacities, each comes with a large set of footnotes that reduces
the magnitude of their threat to the United States. In each case, a much vaunted Arctic
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militarization equates simply to a protection of economic interests and strategic defense.
While Russia is indeed leading the pack in terms of its Arctic military buildup, and
engaging in particularly bellicose rhetoric regarding the region, the actual threat is rather
benign. Russia (for once) is following international law in the region. It has limited its
Arctic buildup to undisputedly Russian territories, and the majority of its military buildup
is oriented at protecting its oil and gas interests and securing the Northern Sea Route as a
viable maritime shipping route. While its actions in the region may seem more
provocative to a US audience – especially in the context of its more overarching foreign
policy and other international actions – its Arctic policy is based on protecting the
interests afforded to it by its accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
5. The “Icebreaker Gap” is not as severe as it is made out to be
It is irrefutable that the United States possesses one of the worst-equipped
icebreaker fleets of the major Arctic powers. It is sorely in need of supplementation –
something that the United States Coast Guard and other public figures have called for
repeatedly in the past. However, the American lack of icebreakers is not as severe a
situation as it may appear. The United States still manages to conduct the work necessary
to its present Arctic position with its current fleet of icebreakers. While the increased
workload caused by potential offshore Alaskan drilling and increased maritime traffic
through the Bering Strait will necessitate additional icebreaking capacity, the total
absence of both at present means that current American capacity is not as deficient as it is
made out to be. Even as shipping and resource exploitation increases, the United States
has far less need for icebreaking, given that Northern Alaska is unlikely to become an
urban area anytime soon.
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A New Arctic Strategy: Cautious Icebreaking
The United States must develop an Arctic Strategy that takes into consideration its
domestic military shortcomings in conjunction with its international aims. If the United
States is to be acknowledged in the Arctic space as the global power that it is elsewhere,
then it must join the rest of the Arctic nations on the same international legal level.
However, given the uncertainty and timeline of the Arctic’s future, the United States
needn’t approach a new Arctic policy with a sense of existential dread, but rather
cautious path finding. The Arctic ice, as an example, is irrefutably receding every year.
However, the pace of this disappearance varies annually, and follows an unpredictably
declining trend with a long time frame. As such, the United States is afforded the luxury
of time in approaching its Arctic deficiencies.
The timeline calls for a slow approach to Arctic policy that solves current
problems without tying the United States to a specific agenda or ideology in the region.
First and foremost, a new Arctic policy should facilitate the US Coast Guard and Navy’s
desired expansion of their Arctic capabilities. This needn’t be a major affair, but rather
provide enough support to meet current needs, and lay the framework to accommodate
future growth at whatever pace it may come. Any new Arctic Policy must also follow and
acknowledge the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that the rest of the world’s Arctic
powers follow. While the United States enjoys the power of supremacy in the rest of the
world, it is too late to the Arctic to direct events in its own exclusive interests. Instead,
the policy must acknowledge the fact that other parties are at the table, and accommodate
the pre-existing policies that have been created by UNCLOS. Finally, the policy should
avoid making provocative statements against other Arctic powers – specifically Russia –
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and focus instead on areas for international collaboration. While US policy in general
may be based on countering Russia, poking the bear has the potential to accelerate
Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic past protection into aggression. The Arctic is one
of the few areas in the world where traditionally opposed powers have the ability to
cooperate. Thus far, the Arctic Council has proven an excellent example of this, as its
members engage in a number of confidence-building measures ranging from Search and
Rescue arrangements to cultural exchanges. A new American Arctic policy should
acknowledge this status quo – which American officials have been participating in for
many years as well – and seek to encourage, rather than destroy it.
Specific Policy Recommendations
Based on the above findings and strategic suggestions, the United States should:
1. Create an “American Arctic Policy” document at the Executive level
While the National Arctic Strategy is a start, the President should take steps to
create specific policy goals and aims that not only bolster current international standards
but also apply them to domestic Arctic spaces as well. This document should follow the
pattern of other nations’ Arctic policy documents in outlining the specific ties of the
United States to the region, and the actions that it will take to protect the area. Such a
document will not only signal to the rest of the world’s Arctic powers that the United
States is now taking the Arctic seriously, but also telegraph an American commitment to
the existing international legal system
2. Accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
The President and interested parties should seek to assuage outdated
Congressional concerns over diminished sovereignty and resource protection in the
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Arctic and elsewhere by pointing to the numerous benefits afforded to the United States
by the Convention. The United State cannot stand alone in the Arctic without accession
to the document, lest forthcoming international legal decisions ignore or invalidate
American claims and potential in the region.
3. Approve or facilitate funding for a new heavy icebreaker, while solving the
question of the Polar Sea
The United States Congress should either approve of the US Coast Guard’s
request for increased funding for a new heavy icebreaker, or increase the Coast Guard’s
budget in a way that would allow it to facilitate the addition of another icebreaker to
active service. At present, the Polar Sea remains laid up due to a lack of a Congressional
mandate on the matter. Either the Polar Sea should be deactivated and decommissioned,
or funds should be allocated to its repair. In the event of the former, Congress should
appropriate funds to the Coast Guard necessary to facilitate the construction of a new
heavy icebreaker to replace the loss in icebreaking capacity represented by the
incapacitation of the Polar Sea. This will also aid in potential American exploration of
natural resource exploitation in traditionally unreachable Arctic zones.
4. Adjudicate an appropriate compromise on the Beaufort Wedge dispute with
Canada
The United States loses out on massive potential revenues from fishing and
commercial resource extraction in the region by not coming to an agreement with Canada
on the matter of the wedge’s ownership. The two nations’ continued dispute over the
matter has resulted in a lose-lose scenario, wherein neither is able to reap the massive
economic benefits that lay beneath the waves. Even if the United States were to split the
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region in half with Canada, it would still gain from being able to harvest half the region’s
resources, as opposed to the present lack of resource extraction in the area. Most
importantly, however, the United States would solve a lasting diplomatic issue with its
closest regional and global ally, building confidence and mutual trust.
5. Improve bilateral capabilities and create agreements with Russia in the Bering
Strait and Canada in the Beaufort Sea
While the Northern Sea Route is a Russian-oriented maritime shipping route, any
vessel transiting through the route will eventually pass through the Bering Strait, which is
a strait that both Russia and the United States have jurisdiction over. Similarly, both
Canada and the United States have jurisdiction over portions of the Beaufort Sea. As
such, if a disaster such as a sinking ship or oil spill were to occur, the United States
would have to respond in tandem with either Russia or Canada. Creating bilateral search
and rescue agreements in both bodies of water and beginning joint training and
information sharing would not only improve relations between either nations, but also
ensure an appropriate and swift response to potentially harmful situations.
6. Strengthen international cooperation through strong Arctic Council leadership
The United States’ chairmanship of the Arctic Council during the time in which
the Arctic is coming to the forefront of Arctic nations’ policies allows the United States a
fast track to leadership in an issue where it has traditionally lagged behind. The United
States, therefore, has the ability to use its chairmanship of the Council to advocate a
particular agenda or goal that will help its case for being acknowledged as a leader in the
Arctic space. This will also have the joint benefit of creating the basis for further
international cooperation in the region.
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Concluding Thoughts
The United States has not “lost” the Arctic, and no other major Arctic nation has
“won” the Arctic. However, the United States certainly is losing the Arctic by failing to
play at the same level as the rest of the world’s Arctic nations. By refusing to accede to
UNCLOS, modernize its fleet of icebreakers and naval equipment, and facilitate
compromises with its closest allies, the United States risks being left behind in the race to
capitalize on the vast resources of the Arctic. Fortunately for the United States, each of
the other Arctic nations has not been able to take a decisive lead in the region, with each
suffering military, economic, or other domestic policy obstacles to regional leadership.
These nations – even those that traditionally do not – are generally cooperating under
various international frameworks, something which makes the Arctic unique amongst the
regions of the world. Ultimately, the United States has the ability to rise to its traditional
leadership role in the Arctic region as it melts if it adopts a certain few policy
recommendations. However, if the United States fails to heed the Arctic’s growing
importance and implement these suggestions, it risks being frozen in the Arctic’s past
forever.
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